It has been now over a decade since the publication of Public Religions in the Modern World and it can be asserted with some confidence that the thesis first presented there that we were witnessing a process of "de-privatization" of religion as a relatively global trend has been amply confirmed. 1 The most important contribution of the book, in my view however, was not so much the relatively prescient empirical observation of such a new global trend, but the analytical-theoretical and normative challenge to the liberal theory of privatization, namely the claim that the thesis of privatization of religion in the modern world was no longer defensible either empirically or normatively. In a certain sense, the best confirmation of the validity of the "de-privatization" of religion can be found in the heartland of secularization, that is, in Western European societies.
1) Its Western-centrism
2) The attempt to restrict, at least normatively, modern public religions to the public sphere of civil society
3) The empirical framing of the study as church-state-nation-civil society relations from a comparative national perspective, neglecting the transnational global dimensions In many respects those short-comings were consciously imposed self-limitations for good methodological, substantive, and strategic reasons. I already acknowledged then in the introduction that it was a "western-centered study, both in terms of the particular cases chosen for investigation and in terms of the normative perspective guiding the investigation." 4 The self-limitation of the study to Western Christendom, in terms of: a) the genealogical reconstruction of particular historical processes of secularization within Latin Christendom (rather than viewing secularization as a general universal process of human and societal development); b) the restriction of the study to mainly Catholicism and Protestantism as particular forms of religion; and c) the restriction to Western (European and post-colonial) societies, was fully justified. At the time, I pleaded "limited time, knowledge, and resources, as well as a postmodern enhanced awareness of the dangers of excessive homogenization," as well, one could add, of the dangers of "orientalism."
Strategically, I was convinced that it was necessary to challenge first empirically and normatively the theory of secularization immanently, as it were from within, within Western societies and within Western discourse, before one could undertake the even more daunting yet necessary task of going beyond Western Christendom and adopting a global comparative perspective. As I indicated then, "such an immense task would have required a modification and expansion of my typology of public religions, of the theory of religious and political differentiation, and of the general analytical framework employed." 5 To a certain extent my work since the publication of the book has been an attempt to address and transcend the three mentioned shortcomings. I've been impelled in this direction, partly by the poignant critique of Talal Asad, partly by my own research on transnational migration and transnational religion, and above all by the inevitability of confronting processes of globalization and their effects on all religions.
Let me now sketch very briefly the way in which I've been trying to address those shortcomings at the three levels: While the two minor sub-theses of the theory of secularization, namely "the decline of religion" and "the privatization of religion," have undergone numerous critiques and revisions in the last 15 years, the core of the thesis, namely the understanding of secularization as a single process of functional differentiation of the various institutional spheres or sub-systems of modern societies remains relatively uncontested in the social sciences, particularly within European sociology. Yet one should ask whether it is appropriate to subsume the multiple and very diverse historical patterns of differentiation and fusion of the various institutional spheres (that is, church and state, state and economy, economy and science) that one finds throughout the history of modern Western societies into a single teleological process of modern functional differentiation. 7 Talal Asad was the first to call our attention to the fact that "the historical process of secularization effects a remarkable ideological inversion…. For at one time 'the secular' was a part of a theological discourse (saeculum)," while later "the religious" is constituted by secular political and scientific discourses, so that "religion" itself as a historical category and as a universal globalized concept emerges as a construction of Western secular modernity. 8 But as I pointed out in my response to Asad's poignant critique, contemporary genealogies of secularism fail to recognize the extent to which the formation of the secular is itself inextricably linked with the internal transformations of European Christianity, from the so-called Papal Revolution to the Protestant Reformation, and from the ascetic and pietistic sects of the seventeenth to eighteenth centuries to the emergence of evangelical, denominational Protestantism in nineteenth-century America. 9 Should one define these transformations as a process of internal secularization of Western Christianity, or as the cunning of secular reason, or both? A proper rethinking of secularization will require a critical examination of the diverse patterns of differentiation and fusion of the religious and the secular and their mutual constitution across all the religions of the world, and specially across the so- called "world religions," even though we are aware thanks to Tomoko Mazusawa how much the "world religions" are also invented constructs of Western secular Christian modernity. 10
The contextualization of our categories, such as "religion," "the secular", "the theologico-political" and so on, should begin with the recognition of the particular Christian historicity of Western European developments, as well as of the multiple and diverse historical patterns of secularization and differentiation within European and Western societies. Such a recognition in turn should allow a less Euro-centric comparative analysis of patterns of differentiation and secularization in other civilizations and world religions, and more importantly the further recognition that with the world-historical process of globalization initiated by the European colonial expansion, all these processes everywhere are dynamically interrelated and mutually constituted.
There are multiple and diverse secularizations in the West and multiple and diverse
Western modernities, and they are still mostly associated with fundamental historical differences between Catholic, Protestant, and Byzantine Christianity, and between Lutheran and Calvinist Protestantism. As David Martin has shown, in the Latin-Catholic cultural area, and to some extent throughout Continental Europe, there was a collision between religion and the differentiated secular spheres-that is, between Catholic Christianity and modern science, modern capitalism, and the modern state. 11 As a result of this protracted clash, the Enlightenment critique of religion found here ample resonance; the secularist genealogy of modernity was constructed as a triumphant emancipation of reason, freedom, and worldly pursuits from the constraints of religion; and practically every "progressive" European social movement from the time of the French Revolution to the present was informed by secularism.
The secularist self-narratives, which have informed functionalist theories of differentiation and secularization, have envisioned this process as the emancipation and expansion of the secular spheres at the expense of a much diminished and confined, though also newly differentiated, religious sphere. The boundaries are well kept; only they are relocated, drastically pushing religion into the margins and into the private sphere.
In the Anglo-Protestant and in Calvinist cultural areas, by contrast, and particularly in the United States, there was "collusion" between religion and the secular differentiated spheres.
There is little historical evidence of any tension between American Protestantism and capitalism and very little manifest tension between science and religion in America prior to the Darwinian crisis at the end of the nineteenth century. The American Enlightenment had hardly any anti-religious component. Even "the separation of church and state" that was constitutionally codified in the dual clause of the First Amendment, was promoted by the religious sects and had as much the purpose of protecting "the free exercise" of religion from state interference and from ecclesiastical establishments as that of protecting the federal secular state from any religious entanglement. It is rare, at least until very recently, to find any "progressive" social movement in America appealing to "secularist" values; appeals to the Gospel and to "Christian" values are certainly much more common throughout the history of American social movements, as well as in the discourse of American presidents.
The purpose of this comparison is not to reiterate the well-known fact that American society is more "religious" and therefore less "secular" than European societies. While the first may be true, the second proposition does not follow. On the contrary, the United States has always been the paradigmatic form of a modern secular, differentiated society. Yet the triumph of "the secular" came aided by religion rather than at its expense, and the boundaries themselves became so diffused that, at least by European ecclesiastical standards, it is not clear where religion begins and the secular ends. Yet it would be ludicrous to argue that the United
States is a less functionally differentiated society, and therefore less modern, and therefore less secular, than France or Sweden. On the contrary, one could argue that there is less functional differentiation of state, economy, science, etc., in étâtiste-laïciste France than in the United
States, but this does not make France either less modern or less secular than the United States.
If the European concept of secularization is not a particularly relevant category for the "Christian" United States, much less may it be directly applicable to other axial civilizations with very different modes of structuration of the religious and the secular. As an analytical conceptualization of a historical process, secularization is a category that makes sense within the context of the particular internal and external dynamics of the transformation of Western European Christianity from the Middle Ages to the present. But the category becomes problematic once it is generalized as a universal process of societal development and once it is transferred to other world religions and other civilizational areas with very different dynamics of structuration of the relations and tensions between religion and world, or between cosmological transcendence and worldly immanence.
The category of secularization could hardly be applicable, for instance, to such "religions" as Confucianism or Taoism, insofar as they are not characterized by high tension with "the world," insofar as their model of transcendence can hardly be called "religious," and insofar as they have no ecclesiastical organization. In a sense those religions that have always been "worldly" and "lay" do not need to undergo a process of secularization. To secularizethat is, "to make worldly" or "to transfer from ecclesiastical to civil use"-is a process that does not make much sense in such a civilizational context. In this respect, China and the Confucian civilizational area have been "secular" avant la lettre. It is the postulated intrinsic correlation between modernization and secularization that is highly problematic. There can be modern societies like the U.S., which are secular while deeply religious; and there can be premodern societies like China, which from our Euro-centric religious perspective look deeply secular and irreligious.
The concept of multiple modernities, first developed by S. N. Eisenstadt, is a more adequate conceptualization and pragmatic vision of modern global trends than either secular cosmopolitanism or the clash of civilizations. In a certain sense, it shares elements from both.
Like cosmopolitanism, the concept of multiple modernities maintains that there are some common elements or traits shared by all "modern" societies that help to distinguish them from their "traditional" or pre-modern forms. But these modern traits or principles attain multiple forms and diverse institutionalizations. Moreover, many of these institutionalizations are continuous or congruent with the traditional historical civilizations. Thus, there is both a civilization of modernity and the continuous transformation of the pre-modern historical civilizations under modern conditions, which help to shape the multiple modernities.
The multiple modernities position rejects both the notion of a modern radical break with traditions as well as the notion of an essential modern continuity with tradition. All traditions and civilizations are radically transformed in the processes of modernization, but they also have the possibility of shaping in particular ways the institutionalization of modern "religious" and "secular" traits. Traditions are forced to respond and adjust to modern conditions, but in the process of reformulating their traditions for modern contexts, they also help to shape the particular forms of "religious" and "secular" modernity. democratic politics and religions which were grounded in traditions that resisted the progressive claims of the Enlightenment philosophy of history, liberalism and secularism; b) a nativist anti-immigrant posture that postulated the inassimilability of foreign immigrants due to their illiberal and uncivilized social customs and habits supposedly grounded in their traditional religion; and c) transnational attachments and loyalties to either a foreign religious authority (i.e., the papacy) or to a transnational religious community (i.e., the umma) that appeared incompatible with republican citizen principles and the exclusive claims of modern nationalism. Any of these three principles may have been more or less salient at any particular time and place. It was their superimposition, however, that has given the anti-Catholic and anti-Muslim discourses their compelling effect.
Public Religions beyond Ecclesiastical Dis-Establishment and Civil
As in the case of Catholicism before, the internal and external debates over the compatibility between Islam and democracy and modern individual freedoms is taking place at three separate yet interrelated levels: 1) in debates over "Islamism", the transnational structure show, the unfortunate deprivatization of religion and its return to the public sphere will need to be managed carefully if one is to avoid undermining those fragile foundations.
Until very recently, moreover, the story of secularization was embedded within an even broader narrative of general teleological processes of social modernization and progressive human development. The West simply showed the future to the rest of the world. Today, there
is an increasing recognition that we may be entering a global "post-secular" age and that, as
Mark Lilla pointed out in a cover story of The New York Times Magazine "the great separation" of religion and politics may be a rather unique and exceptional historical achievement, the more In terms of religious majority/minority relations, the model throughout Europe has remained either that of one single national church that claims to be coextensive with the nation or that of two (usually Catholic and Protestant) competing but territorially based national churches, along with an indefinite but limited number of religious minorities, which have assumed the structural position of sects vis-à-vis the national churches.
Indeed, despite all the normative discourse and the often repeated trope of the modern secular democratic state and the privatization of religion, it is legitimate to question how "secular" are really the European states? How tall and solid are the "walls of separation" between national state and national church and between religion and politics across Europe?
To which extent should one attribute the indisputable success of post-World War II Western European democracies to the secularization of society and the privatization of religion, as it is so frequently done? If one looks at the reality of "really existing" European democracies rather than at the official secularist discourse, it becomes obvious that most European states are by no means strictly secular nor do they tend to live up to the myth of secular neutrality.17
France is the only Western European state which is officially and proudly "secular," that 17 Stepan, "Crafting the 'Twin Tolerations'," pp. 218-225.
is, that defines itself and its democracy as regulated by the principles of laïcité. Benedict XIV proved to be one of the few sane voices in Europe condemning the senseless 19 Casanova, "Globalizing Catholicism." slaughter of European youth, the papal order heard much more loudly the nationalist calls to arms. French as well as German Jesuits returned to serve their nations and to die for their fatherlands. It would be unthinkable today for the Jesuits or any other Catholic transnational order to join a nationalist war.
From 1870 to the present one can witness the reconstitution of all the transnational dimensions of Catholicism that had nearly disappeared with the emergence of the Westphalian system of sovereign territorial states: uncontested papal supremacy, ecumenical councils, transnational religious orders, transnational cadres, a transnational Curia, transnational centers of Catholic learning, transnational pilgrimages, and transnational Catholic movements.
If the transformation of contemporary Catholicism illustrates the opportunities which the process of globalization offers to a transnational religious regime with a highly centralized structure and an imposing transnational network of human, institutional and material resources, which feels therefore confident in its ability to thrive in a relatively open global system of religious regimes, contemporary Pentecostalism may serve to illustrate the equally favorable opportunities which globalization offers to a highly decentralized religion, with no historical links to tradition and no territorial roots or identity, and which therefore can make itself at home anywhere in the globe where the Spirit moves. 20 We make take Brazil as a paradigmatic example. is illuminating in so far as it was one of the first prominent voices calling attention to th increasing relevance of civilizations and civilizational identities in the emerging global order and in global conflicts. But it is also profoundly misleading insofar as it still conceives of civilizations as territorial geopolitical units, akin to superpowers, having some world religion as its cultural core. e This process of dissociation of territory, religion and civilizational culture is by no means uniform or homogeneous across world religions and civilizations, and indeed it encounters much resistance on the part of states which still aspire not only to the monopolistic control of the means of violence but also to the administrative regulation of religious groups and cultural identities over their territories, as well as on the part of "churches", in the broad Weberian sense of the term, as religious institutions or as religious imagined communities which claim or aspire to religious monopoly over their civilizational or national territories.
There is a fundamental tension in the modern world between two well-recognized principles. There is on the one hand the principle of the inalienable right of the individual person to freedom of conscience and therefore to freedom of religion, but also to freedom of conversion. This principle has assumed in all modern democratic societies the form of an unquestioned universal human right. Nobody should be coerced or forced to believe or not to believe any particular religious doctrine. Consequently, everybody has also the right to believe or not to believe any particular religious doctrine, including the right to conversion to any particular religion. On the other hand, there is also the increasing recognition of the collective I use cosmopolitanism here in the broad sense of any worldview that envisions the future global order as a single relatively homogeneous and unified global economic, political and cultural system or as a single human "universal civilization." To a certain extent, most theories of globalization share similar cosmopolitan assumptions insofar as they assume that economic and technological globalization will determine the shape of global society and of global culture.
Though more complex, Luhmannian theories of "world society" are based on similar assumptions.
Cosmopolitanism builds upon developmental theories of modernization that envision social change as a global expansion of Western modernity, which is understood not as the hegemonic expansion of a particular social formation, but as a universal process of human development. In most cosmopolitan accounts, religion either does not exist, or it is simply "invisible" in Thomas Luckmann's sense of the term of being an individualized and privatized form of salvation or quest for meaning, that is irrelevant to the functioning of the primary institutions of modern society. In its collective dimension, religion is simply reduced to just another form of cultural group identity. If and when religion emerges in the public sphere and has to be taken seriously, it is usually branded either as anti-modern fundamentalism resisting processes of secularization, or as a form of traditionalist collective identity reaction to the threat of globalization. In other words, religion in the eyes of cosmopolitan elites is either irrelevant or reactive. Indeed, when it comes to religion all forms of cosmopolitanism share at least implicitly the basic tenets of the theory of secularization which the social sciences and modern liberal political ideologies have inherited from the Enlightenment critique of religion.
Cosmopolitanism remains a faithful child of the European Enlightenment.
It is time to revise our teleological conceptions of a global cosmopolitan secular modernity against which we can characterize the religious "other" as "fundamentalist." It is time to make room for more complex, nuanced and reflexive categories which will help us to understand better the already emerging global system of multiple modernities. As long as we maintain this concept of a single cosmopolitan modernity as a general process of secular differentiation, indeed as a normative global project, we are compelled to characterize all forms of religion we cannot accept as our own as threatening "fundamentalism" and we become ourselves unwittingly partisans in a supposedly worldwide secular-religious conflict and may even help turn the so-called "clash of civilizations" into a self-fulfilling prophecy. What is at stake, ultimately, is the recognition of the irremediable plurality of universalisms and the multiplicity of modernities, namely, that every universalism and every modernity is particularistic. One could say that we are moving from a condition of competing particularist universalisms to a new condition of global denominational contextualism.
Under conditions of globalization, moreover, all the world religions do not only draw upon their own traditions but also increasingly upon one another. Intercivilizational encounters, cultural imitations and borrowings, diasporic diffusions, hybridity, creolization, and transcultural hyphenations are as much part and parcel of the global present as Western hegemony, cosmopolitan homogenization, religious fundamentalism or the clash of civilizations.
